Published Works

1.The economics and Logistics of horse-drawn armies

British Journal for Military History (BJMH) Vol Issue Published

Abstract:The capabilities of horse-drawn armies were recorded by contemporary observers and by later historians, nonetheless there has been a continuing debate regarding the capacity and workings of these forces, particularly once they were integrated with and then superseded by, newer forms of transport such as railways and motor vehicles. This paper argues that little attention has been paid to the wider economic environment in which these armies operated, and in turn the supply of these armies can be considered as an economic system in its own right.

You can dowload the artilce here

2. The influence of railways on military operations in the Russo-German War 1941-45

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 30 Issue 02 published May 2017

doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1308120

How Soviet railway superiority made a significant impact on the course of the war

Abstract: In common with much of the historiography of the Russo-German War of 1941-45 there has been extensive study of the role of railways in the war with either side concentrating on different aspects of the subject. But to date there has little attempt to make a comparative study of the railways on both sides and to gauge the effect of differences in capacity on military operations and their outcomes. This lack has allowed one or both sides to obscure key failures and to deflect the influence on military operations away from railways. Yet the ubiquitous nature of railways for travel and transport in Russia, due to the large size of the country and the inability of motor vehicles to support operations beyond 3-400 km, meant that every military operation of the war was dependant on railways and the way in which they were used was a key element in their success or failure. The current study aims to compare operating practices between Soviet and German military railways, to give estimates of the railway capacity available to both sides and then to use this information to gauge the effect of this capacity on military operations.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

3. Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army – Motor Transport 

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 31 Issue 04 published December 2018

doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360

Abstract: Motor vehicles have always been regarded as an indicator of modernity, technological advancement and industrial progress, right from the time of the first motor car in 1885. The Soviet Union was no exception, and there is an extensive Soviet historiography of the development of motor transport and its use during the German-Soviet War. The aim of this article is to put the wartime military and economic use of Soviet vehicles into a wider context, highlighting how mechanization was not the only important variable in successful logistics. The case study here will be the role of transportation in the logistics of a Soviet combined arms army (общевойсковая армия) utilizing detailed primary source material from the pamyat-naroda.ru website.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

4. Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army – the rear

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol Issue published March 2021

doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2020.1845091

Abstract: This article sets out to examine the inner working of combined-arms armies logistics over the course of the war through the use of a series of seven reports contained within the Collection of Materials on the Experience of War’ and comparing these assessments with statistics from archival documents on two actual operations, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev in August 1943 and the Vistula-Oder Operation in January 1945. These results show that combined-arms armies gained their operational mobility from rapid re-establishment of railways and a carefully choreographed use of a small motor vehicle fleet, coupled with strict adherence to weight limits and living off the land by combat troops and their horse-drawn transport. This achievement of high mobility using limited means was a unique approach particularly tailored to the Red Army’s force structure and the Soviet Union’s available economic support.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript here

5. Logistics of the Tank Army - Uman-Botosani Operation

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 33 Issue 03 published December 2020

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360

Abstract: The Uman- Botosani Operation in January 1944 was the first occasion that a Tank Army managed to conduct a deep penetration operation against the German Army. Despite the Rasputitsa, Soviet armoured forces cut the Heeresgruppe in half and opened up a 300 km gap in their defences that was never really closed. Archival material on this operation now allows a new interpretation of this critical operation and comes to some surprising conclusions.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

6. Logistics and mobility of mechanized corps

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 34 Issue 2 published December 2021

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990556

Abstract: David Glantz described the Soviet use of forward detachments as the ‘tip of the spear’ of a tank army; small, armored, heavily armed and fully motorized groups wending their way through the German defenses, avoiding contact and operating up to 50 km in advance of the main body. This article seeks to examine the other end, the ‘butt of the spear’: the mechanized corps which provided the mass of infantry required to defend the bridgehead at the end of the offensive. Although they contained a large number of vehicles, the scale of allocation was nothing like that of Western armies and, given wartime shortages, even these were not met. So how did the mechanized corps keep up on the long distance operations of late 1944? This article analyzes the mobility and logistics of mechanized corps during the campaigns of 1945. Using this example, it will seek to explain how the units operated as part of the larger tank armies, and how their use evolved during the earlier campaigns of 1943-44.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

7. Managing Shortage: The role of Centre Bases of the NKO in overcoming supply constraints in the Red Army, 1941–1945

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 37 Issue 1 published May 2024

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2024.2340837

Abstract: In the winter of 1941, the Red Army faced a shell crisis brought on by the loss of its pre-war stocks due to the rapidity of the German advance that summer, the dislocation of industry due to evacuation to the Urals, and the large expansion in the size of the army. Materiel shortages during the battle for Moscow forced reform in both the approach to and administration of handling all manner of supplies. This saw the introduction of strict rationing of munitions supplies at the Front level, and the centralization of munitions distribution and stocks by the Rear in the Centre Bases of the NKO.(1 NKO refers to both to the department, the People’s Commissariat of Defense, and the office of the Commissar of Defense, held for most of the war by Joseph Stalin.)

This use of a centralized supply system allowed the Red Army to use a ‘just in time’ approach to supplying the Fronts that enabled it to make maximum use of a limited number of supplies and to maintain a high tempo of operations.

This paper was published as Open Source thanks to the support of University of East Anglia, so you can read it on the Journal of Slavic Military Studies

8. Patterns of War: A Re-interpretation of the Chronology of the German-Soviet War 1941–1945

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 36 Issue 2 published October 2023

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2023.2251305

Abstract: Most histories of the Soviet-German War 1941–1945 in English, German, and Russian, adopt a narrative framework based on the sequence of major battles, such as Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin. This approach portrays the war from a specific viewpoint reducing the importance of other fronts or secondary battles. Nevertheless, this study looks at an alternative narrative, the Soviet ‘canon of operations’, which was produced by the Military-Historical Department of the General Staff of the Red Army. This radically different account changes the viewpoint to a broad front war and alters our understanding of the issues facing the Soviet High Command and its resource management.

This paper was published as Open Source thanks to the support of University of East Anglia, so you can read it on the Journal of Slavic Military Studies

 

Works scheduled for Publication

Routledge Handbook on the Russian/Soviet Military

Chapter on the history of Russian logistics from 1700 to 2022.

Works in Preparation

Logistics of the Front: The power behind soviet mobility

Logistics and mobility of Cavalry-mechanized groups

The NKPS: Soviet Railways during the Soviet-German War

Thesis: Red Army Logistics during the Soviet-German War 1941-1945

 

 Public Talks

YouTube: World War Two TV - Planning and Preparation for Operation Bagration by the Soviet High Command - JULY 2024

In 1926 Boris Shaposhnikov wrote his classic study on the subject of High Command in his book "The Brain of the Army" and he was Chief of the General Staff in the dark days of 1941 when the German Army. His writings inspired the creation of the Soviet system of High Command: the State Defence Committee (GKO), Stavka, Genstab, Strategic Direction Commands, Stavka Representatives and Front Commands. How did these bodies work together to control an army of 12 million especially in the climactic days of the summer of 1944? How does this system compare to the Allied system of multi-national command? One of the problems facing historians is that there is no single work in English on the Soviet High Command during the war. John Erickson's classic study only covers the period 1918-1941 and little has been written since then. Today's talk will look at all levels of the Soviet High Command and how they interacted together, how we might interpret the role of Stalin and the implications of the structure in delivering Soviet victories. We will compare Soviet accounts of the war and see how they differ from Anglo-Saxon interpretations and what this reveals. Then using this understanding, we will look at the details of the planning that went into the successful Operation Bagration.

YouTube: World War Two TV - RAILWAYS in German occupied Eastern Europe - OCT 2023

By 1942, Germany controlled most of the railways of Europe as far east as the Caucasus mountains. The question is how did they organise and manage this vast network and harness it to Germany's war aims? Also given the German's racial philosophy, how did they operate the railways in Eastern Europe, vital for their war against the Soviet Union? The story of Germany's Eastern railways is one of contradictions and controversary which reveals some surprising elements of the chaotic nature of German rule in the Ostraum, a story carefully concealed after the end of the war.

YOUTUBE: WORLD WAR TWO TV - The Red Army Motor Fleet and Lend-Lease - DEC 2022

It has long been accepted that America's contribution to victory in the Second World War was both through her military efforts and through her industrial prowess in giving weapons to the rest of the world through Lend-Lease. The US contributed a huge tonnage of supplies to the USSR to help it sustain its war effort and a significant part of this was in motor vehicles. In fact, some authors have claimed that much of the success of the Red Army from 1943 onwards was due to these vehicles. It's a view point even supported by many Soviet historians. But is it all too good to be true?

YOUTUBE: WORLD WAR TWO TV - THE INVISIBLE ARMY: HORSE DRAWN ARMIES in the age of the motor vehicle - June 2022

Why study horses? Well the reason is that Horses have provided the motive power for armies for literally thousands of years yet the number of studies on them can be measured on the fingers of one hand. The reality is that the standard European army in SWW used railways for strategic transport, motor vehicles for operational transport to connect the railway to the army and to pull heavy artillery and horses for tactical transport and to pull field artillery.  Germany, France, Soviet Union, Italy all used horses and in this way and were little different from armies of FWW. US and Britain are the exception because they are by far the richest countries in the world at the time. Their populations owned more motor vehicles than any other nations but more importantly neither used large mass armies.

HIstory Goes On - British Commission for Military History Covid Lockdown Seminars: Logistics of a Combined-Arms Army of the Red Army - 2021

HGW Davie, The Logistics of Combined-Arms Army (no longer available)