Marches & mobility
H.G.W. Davie
Mechanized Corps – a study in mobility and ...

Mechanised Corps were the elite of Soviet armoured forces, kept fully up to strength, more tanks than a Tank Corps, twice the size of a Rifle Division. So what does the word 'Mechanised' mean, how many vehicles did they have, how mobile were these units in reailty?

Mechanized Corps – a study in mobility and transport

Rear of the Red Army

Published: The Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army— the Rear: High Mobility Through Limited Means

Published: The Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army— the Rear: High Mobility Through Limited Means

This article sets out to examine the inner working of combined-arms armies logistics over the course of the war through the use of a series of seven reports contained within the ‘Collection of Materials on the Experience of War’ and comparing these assessments with statistics from archival documents on two actual operations, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev in August 1943 and the Vistula-Oder Operation in January 1945. These results show that combined-arms armies gained their operational mobility from rapid re-establishment of railways and a carefully choreographed use of a small motor vehicle fleet, coupled with strict adherence to weight limits and living off the land by combat troops and their horse-drawn transport. This achievement of high mobility using limited means was a unique approach particularly tailored to the Red Army’s force structure and the Soviet Union’s available economic support.

Logistics of a Combined-arms Army of the Red Army - Seminar Presentation

Logistics of a Combined-arms Army of the Red Army - Seminar Presentation

As part of the ‘History Goes On’ seminar series, they have featured my delayed, seminar presentation. This was originally designed to be presented at the Second World War Group Conference in 2021 and to accompany the release of my article in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 33 No. 4 due March 2021.

Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army — Motor Transport

Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army — Motor Transport

Motor vehicles have always been regarded as an indicator of modernity, technological advancement, and industrial progress, right from the time of the first motor car in 1885. The Soviet Union was no exception, and there is an extensive Soviet historiography of the development of motor transport and its use during the German-Soviet War. The aim of this article is to put the wartime military and economic use of Soviet vehicles into a wider context, highlighting how mechanization was not the only important variable in successful logistics. The case study here will be the role of transportation in the logistics of a Soviet combined arms army (общевойсковая армия) utilizing detailed primary source material from the pamyat-naroda.ru website.

The contribution of Occupied Europe to the German wartime economy

The contribution of Occupied Europe to the German wartime economy

In December 1941, the nature of the Second World War was changed irrevocably by the German defeat at the Battle of Moscow. Up to this point Germany had been able to win each of her individual wars in a single campaign, utilising the Heer's military expertise to overcome Germany's enemies one by one and using a fixed stock of military personnel and materiel. However the Soviet Union had managed to bend before the German storm and although her pre-war army had been destroyed, had created new armies and divisions in sufficient time to halt the German advance outside the capital, so forcing the need for a second campaign. This fact changed the nature of the war from one of single military operations to one of a series of campaigns utilising national economic output to equip and sustain multiple operations continuously over a period of years. From this point onwards, the level of mobilisation of a country's economy would be a significant factor in winning or losing the war.

Which poses the question what were the relative sizes of the German and Soviet economies? After all Germany could call on the resources of an occupied Europe while the USSR had lost large amounts of territory, around 60-80 million people and 40% of its economic base. By contrast one in every three 'German' soldiers fighting on the Eastern Front was not a German national.